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COMMENTS
STATUTORY CAPS: AN INVOLUNTARY
CONTRIBUTION TO THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS OR A
REASONABLE MECHANISM FOR OBTAINING
AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE?
A medical malpractice insurance crisis occurred in the mid-1970s and
mid-1980s evidenced by escalating malpractice insurance rates and increas-
ing numbers of malpractice claims.' Insurance companies maintained that
the increase in insurance rates was necessary because of the sharp rise in the
number of malpractice lawsuits, astronomical damage awards, and ineffec-
tive mechanisms to prevent and to eliminate nonmeritorious claims.2 Physi-
cians responded by forming their own insurance companies,3 cancelling
high-risk procedures,4 and orchestrating intensive legislative lobbying for
tort reform.' Insurance companies, physicians, and the legislature collabo-
rated efforts to resolve this medical malpractice crisis.
A national debate erupted regarding the proper way to address the medi-
1. David Holthaus, After Tort Reform: What's Next?, 62 HOSPIrrALS, Sept. 20, 1988, at
48; Jane C. Arancibia, Note, Statutory Caps on Damage Awards in Medical Malpractice Cases,
13 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 135, 137-39 (1988). "Hospital insurance premiums rose from $61
million in 1960 to $1.2 billion in 1976." Id. See also Daryl L. Jones, Note, Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group: The Supreme Court Uncaps the Constitutionality of Statutory Limitations on
Medical Malpractice Recoveries, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1075, 1078 (1986) (explaining that
physicians, the insurance industry, and legislators referred to the phenomenon of increases in
malpractice claims as a "medical malpractice crisis"). The frequency of tort claims filed per
one hundred doctors rose from about one claim per one hundred doctors in 1960 to an esti-
mated high of seventeen claims per one hundred doctors in the mid-1980s before leveling off at
thirteen claims per one hundred doctors at the end of the 1980s. PAUL C. WEBER, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 94 (1991).
2. Joan Beck, An Ugly Fight: ABA vs AMA, CH. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1986, § 1, at 10; Susan
Okie, GAO Targets Insurance Costs: Medical Malpractice Policies Soar to $4. 7 Billion, WAsH.
POST, June 6, 1987, at A13; see also Jones, supra note 1, at 1078-79 (stating that "insurers
asserted that providing malpractice insurance was both risky and unprofitable"). See Martin J.
Hatlie, Professional Liability, 261 JAMA 2881 (1989)(stating that the frequency of medical
malpractice claims escalated dramatically in the mid-1980s).
3. Beck, supra note 2, at 10.
4. Laurie Goring, Bill Urges Malpractice Award Cap, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 10, 1987, § 2, at
6.
5. Jones, supra note 1, at 1079.
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cal malpractice insurance crisis.6 Insurance companies and physicians pres-
sured state legislatures to reform liability laws that, in their opinion,
permitted recovery of excessive damage awards by plaintiffs.7 Consumer
groups and lawyers suggested tighter regulation of the insurance industry.8
State legislatures, in an attempt to remedy the perception that injured plain-
tiffs were overcompensated for their injuries, enacted "tort reform legisla-
tion," which included statutory caps on damages recoverable in medical
malpractice actions.9 As a result of the extensive lobbying effort by physi-
cians and insurance companies, twenty-seven states enacted statutes limiting
recovery of damages in medical malpractice lawsuits.'° Lawyers responded
by challenging state malpractice legislation on constitutional grounds,"' al-
leging violations of federal and state equal protection and due process
6. Michael J. Abramowitz, W. Va. Court Halts Insurers' Cancellations, WASH. POST,
May 10, 1986, at Dl.
7. Id.; see also Goring, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that jury verdicts in malpractice actions
vary even for similar injuries sustained).
8. Abramowitz, supra note 6, at Dl.
9. Holthaus, supra note 1, at 48. The feeling that the insurance crisis was widespread
was reflected in the United States General Accounting Office Report entitled Medical Malprac-
tice: A Framework For Action. This extensive report suggested reforms on the legal level. Tort
reforms included statutory caps, abolishment of joint and several liability, elimination of the
collateral source rule, and periodic judgment payments. The report also suggested reforms on
the medical level such as review panels and better disciplinary and investigative techniques by
the American Medical Association. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (1987). See also Okie, supra note 2, at A13 (noting
that malpractice insurance costs rose from $2.5 billion in 1983 to $4.7 billion in 1985).
10. ALA. CODE § 6-5-544 (Supp. 1991); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010(a) and (b) (1991);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (1987 & Supp.
1991); Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 160 (repealed
1991); Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 162, 1975 Idaho Sess. Laws 1-13 (repealed 1981); Act effective
Nov. 11, 1975, ch. 79-960, § 4, 1975 Ill. Laws 960 (repealed 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-
2-2 (Bums 1990 & Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 (Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.39 (West 1992); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108 (1989 & Supp.
1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.1483 (West Supp. 1992); Act effective May 4, 1990, ch. 455, 1986 Minn. Laws 88 (re-
pealed 1990); Act effective 1983, ch. 189, 1983 Mont. Laws 675 (repealed 1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-2825 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507-C: 7, 508: 4-d (1983 & Supp. 1991);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 26.1-14-11
(1989 & Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Anderson 1991); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (1987 & Supp. 1992); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(i) §§
11.01-11.05 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1992); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-581.15 (Michie 1984), as amended by VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie Supp. 1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8
(Supp. 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 655.27 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991). The District of Columbia
City Council is currently deciding whether to enact a statutory cap on noneconomic damages
in medical malpractice actions. Molly Sinclair, Battle Lines Form in Malpractice Debate,
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1992, at B4.
11. Beck, supra note 2, at 10.
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clauses and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 12 Opponents of
the cap also asserted violations of state constitution provisions such as the
"open courts" provision or the "special legislation" clause.' 3 To date, ten
state courts have held that statutory caps are unconstitutional. 4 Statutory
caps and other tort reform measures are extremely important in light of pro-
posed health care legislation entitled the Health Care Liability Reform and
Quality of Care Improvement Act of 1992 [the "Health Care Bill"].' 5
This Comment critically examines the constitutionality of statutory caps
on damages in medical malpractice actions. It focuses on the public policy
behind the caps and the constitutional issues embodied in limiting an indi-
vidual's recovery. It also analyzes the impact of the Health Care Bill on
statutory caps. Part I outlines the medical malpractice insurance crisis, de-
scribes the statutory reforms and discusses the public policy behind tort re-
form. Part II examines the constitutionality of statutory caps and
12. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991); Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976), cert.denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Wright v. Central Du
Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976); Williams v. Kushner, 549 So. 2d 294 (La. 1989);
White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980);
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio
1991); Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
13. Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1986); Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Wright v. Central Du
Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of La. State
Univ., 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988); Ether-
idge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
14. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 171 (Ala. 1991) (cap violates right
to a jury trial and equal protection clause of the state constitution); Smith v. Department of
Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089 (Fla. 1987) (cap violates state "open courts" provision); Wright v.
Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 744 (Ill. 1976) (cap violates "special legisla-
tion" clause and equal protection clause of state constitution); Kansas Malpractice Victims
Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 260, 264 (Kan. 1988) (cap violates right to a jury trial and
"open courts" provision of state constitution); White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Mont.
1983) (cap violates equal protection guarantees), rev'd on other grounds, Meech v. Hillhaven
West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (N.H. 1980) (cap
violates equal protection clause of the state and federal constitution); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 135 (N.D. 1978) (cap violates equal protection clause of state constitution); Mor-
ris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 7771 (Ohio 1991) (cap violates due process clause of the state
constitution); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex. 1988) (cap violates "open
courts" provision of state constitution); Sofie v. Fireboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 723 (Wash.
1989) (cap violates state constitutional right to a jury trial).
15. H.R. 3037, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). On May 15, 1991 President Bush recom-
mended enactment of the Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act
of 1991. H.R. Doc. No. 84, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). On July 2, 1992, President Bush
submitted the Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act of 1992.
138 CONG. REC. S9772-02 (daily ed. July 2, 1992); 138 CONG. REC. H5976-07 (daily ed. July
2, 1992). The 1992 bill contains the core provisions of the 1991 bill. Id. The 1992 bill also
recommends that treatment under federally funded health care programs and federal employee
benefit programs be reformed irrespective of state tort reform initiatives. Id.
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summarizes the arguments of the proponents and the opponents of these
caps. Part III discusses the Health Care Bill and its impact on medical mal-
practice legislation with respect to statutory caps. This Comment concludes
that a compromise must be reached that addresses both the growing health
care insurance crisis and the protection of individual rights. The Health
Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act of 1992 at-
tempts to achieve this compromise.
I. THE MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS AND LEGISLATIVE TORT
REFORMS
The medical malpractice crisis of the 1970s and 1980s can be attributed to
a combination of factors. During the early 1970s, and again in the 1980s,
medical malpractice claims increased, damage awards escalated, and
amounts paid under insurance policies rose.' 6 Insurance companies argued
that the rising number of frivolous claims, coupled with high and erratic jury
verdicts, decreased the predictability of the rate structure, forcing the insur-
ance companies to raise premiums. 17 Critics of the insurance industry sug-
gested that these increases in malpractice claims and damage awards were
not reflected in insurance premiums in a timely fashion. t8 Initially, invest-
ment gains in the stock market obscured the inadequacy of premiums and
rates. 9 When the stock market gains declined, the insurance companies'
surplus suffered massive losses.20 Consequently, the insurance companies'
approach to medical malpractice insurance changed: premiums escalated
and certain coverage was reduced or eliminated.21 Many insurance compa-
nies went bankrupt.22 As a result, the cost and availability of insurance na-
16. Arancibia,*supra note 1, at 138; Jones, supra note 1, at 1078. The leading medical
malpractice insurance companies reported a 55% increase in claims from 1980 to 1986.
Arancibia, supra note 1, at 138. There was also a corresponding premium increase. Id.
17. Arancibia, supra note 1, at 137.
18. Williams v. Kushner, 549 So. 2d 294, 306 (La. 1989) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting); Wylie
A. Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective, 637 INS. L.J. 90, 96
(1976). See also Barry A. Oster, Medical Malpractice Insurance, 45 INs. Cous. J. 228, 231
(1978); see generally Arancibia, supra note 1, at 137-38 (discussing malpractice insurance
costs).
19. Kushner, 549 So. 2d at 306. See generally Arancibia, supra note 1, at 137-38 (discuss-
ing rise in malpractice insurance premiums); Aitken, supra note 18, at 96. Physicians assert
that premiums were raised to compensate for paper losses in the insurance industry's capital
and surplus portfolios as a result of a general investment market depression. Oster, supra note
18, at 231.
20. Kushner, 549 So. 2d at 306; Oster, supra note 18, at 231. See generally Aitken, supra
note 18, at 96; Arancibia, supra note 1, at 137-38 (discussing the impact of malpractice claims
on the insurance industry).
21. Kushner, 549 So. 2d at 306; Aitken, supra note 18, at 96.
22. Kushner, 549 So. 2d at 306.
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tionwide was significantly impacted.23 Some commentators suggested that
other factors, including lack of patient trust, increase in- public litigiousness,
increase in medical error due to advanced technology, and lawyers' contin-
gency fees contributed to the malpractice crisis.
24
In response to the crisis, state legislatures passed 'the first set of tort re-
forms. Twenty-seven state legislatures enacted tort reform legislation which
included statutory caps on economic and noneconomic damages. 25 These
statutory caps were at the heart of the controversy over tort reform. Insur-
ers and physicians blamed lawyers and juries for the medical malpractice
insurance crisis.26 The American Hospital Association (AHA) argued that
the most immediate effect on the malpractice crisis would be a cap on
noneconomic damage recoveries, particularly for pain and suffering.27 The
AHA contended that juries add to the crisis because they fail to consider the
societal impact of large awards.28 Physicians argued that the problem was
that "[j]uries have no guidelines to measure noneconomic losses[;] ... in two
recent suits, in which people suffered slight but similar injuries, juries
awarded one patient $97,000 in noneconomic damages and the other got
$280,000. "29 Insurers and physicians claimed that the statutory cap would
ensure consistency among jury verdicts30 providing incentive for lawyers to
settle and eliminating the possibility of a huge jury verdict and the corre-
sponding large contingency fee.31
Legal commentators argued that statutory caps would inflict injustice on
people with legitimate claims and those most severely injured.32 Tort law
essentially shifts the costs of injuries caused by negligence to the individual
who breached a duty of due care. 3 Caps, therefore, would be contrary to
the very essence of tort law because some plaintiffs would be virtually un-
compensated for severe injuries. 34 Rather than adopting a straight inflexible
statutory cap on damages, the judiciary should provide guidelines for juries
in calculating damages.35 Guidelines would offer the flexibility and equity
23. Id.
24. Arancibia, supra note 1, at 138.
25. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.




29. Goring, supra note 4, at 6.
30. See id. (noting that caps will have an immediate effect on inconsistent jury awards).
31. Burda, supra note 26, at 53.
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necessary to balance the individual's right to full compensation against the
predictability in insurance rates and to ensure the availability of malpractice
insurance. 36 The American Bar Association rejected the idea of statutory
caps and urged that judges be more active in reducing excessive damage
awards.37 Legal commentators suggested other means of resolving the crisis:
Medical malpractice must be decreased and incompetent physi-
cians restrained or replaced; if the medical profession can't police
itself better, states must do so, however undesirable that may be
.... Changes must be made in the legal system so that a much
larger share of awards goes to real malpractice victims and less is
eaten up by legal costs, and so that there are effective disincentives
for filing frivolous cases.38
To evaluate the effectiveness of statutory caps, two independent studies on
tort reform were completed during the 1970s.3 9 One study found that by
1978 statutory caps on damage awards materially decreased the rise in claim
severity." The other study concluded that tort reform legislation had little
effect on curing the medical malpractice insurance crisis.41 Tort reform in
California, however, has been effective.42 Following the enactment of tort
reform in 1976, physicians' premiums were approximately 30% lower across
the board in California than were the premiums of physicians in other states
that had not placed caps on noneconomic damages.43
More and more commentators argue that tort reform is an obsolete cure
for the medical malpractice crisis." They suggest that legislatures must en-
act nontraditional and innovative measures to ensure a balance between the
compensation of victims and the protection of the medical profession.45
36. Id.
37. David G. Savage, Bar Panel Rejects Idea of a Ceiling on Damage Awards, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1987, at 4.
38. Beck, supra note 2, at 10.
39. Arancibia, supra note 1, at 139.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Hatlie, supra note 2, at 2882.
43. Id.
44. Holthaus, supra note 1, at 48; Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Malpractice and the Tort
System, 262 JAMA 3320, 3326 (1989).
45. Holthaus, supra note 1, at 48. "Tort reform is after the fact .... The whole tort
system is a kind of a mop-up operation." Id. at 53 (quoting Dr. Sidney Wolfe, director of
Public Citizen Health Research Group). See Antoinette D. Paglia, Comment, Taking the Tort
Out of Court-Administrative Adjudication of Medical Liability Claims: Is it the Next Step?, 20
Sw. U. L. REV. 41, 42 (1991) (noting that previous tort reforms have failed to provide an
adequate remedy). "Successful resolution will undoubtedly depend on the willingness of legis-
latures to explore and experiment with innovative methods of alternative dispute resolution."
Statutory Caps
Suggestions include arbitration,4" medical review panels, 47 agency adjudica-
tion of medical malpractice claims, 48 patient compensation funds49 and ac-
celerated compensation event systems.5" Medical malpractice is not a single
problem; it is a series of problems spanning the legal and medical professions
as well as the insurance industry." To resolve the problem, the medical
profession and the insurance markets must be regulated and controlled; at
the same time, the court must make a consistent assessment of tort
liability.
5 2
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY CAPS
A. Equal Protection
53
A majority of courts invalidate statutory caps on medical malpractice
damages as a violation of the equal protection clause of the state or the fed-
eral constitution. 54 Courts consistently utilize a two-tier approach in analyz-
46. Paglia, supra note 45, at 44. Arbitration is an effective means of reducing the time and
cost involved with medical malpractice claims. Id. Notably, Senator Pete V. Domenici has
introduced a proposal whereby plaintiffs would bring their medical malpractice claims to an
arbitration panel. Sarah Glazer, Whatever Happened to the Malpractice Insurance Crisis?,
WASH. POST, July 9, 1991, Health Section, at 11.
47. Paglia, supra note 45, at 43. Although screening panels are not a workable solution to
the medical liability crisis, they are seen as a means of weeding out nonmeritorious claims. Id.
48. Id.
49. Abramowitz, supra note 6, at DI.
50. Accelerated compensation event system is a no fault system proving an exclusive rem-
edy for many obstretrical injuries. Walter Wadlington, Medical Injury Compensation A Time
for Testing New Approaches, 265 JAMA 2861 (1991). The malpractice victim need not prove
fault in order to recover damages. Id. Certain "avoidable events" trigger payment. Id. Ac-
cordingly, this system would limit the number of recoveries. Id. Health Care providers and
patients contract, in advance of injury, the accelerated compensation events. Id.; see also
WEBER, supra note 1, at 94 (eliminating tort liability from contractual agreements between
physicians and patients).
51. Jacobson, supra note 44, at 3320.
52. Id.
53. Equal protection of the law guarantees that a reasonable basis exists for a distinction
in treatment between those individuals within a class and those individuals that fall outside of
a class. Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 771 (Ohio 1991). Legislation should apply equally
to all individuals within a class. Id.
54. Id.; Williams v. Kushner, 549 So. 2d 294 (La. 1989); accord Waggoner v. Gibson, 647
F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1986); Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal.),
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985) (Mosk & Bird, J.J., dissenting); Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Sibley v. Board of
Supervisors of La. State Univ., 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985) (Blanche, J., dissenting); Wright v.
Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (III. 1976); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825
(N.H. 1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Duren v. Suburban Community
Hosp., 482 N.E.2d 1358 (Ohio C.P. 1985).
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ing equal protection challenges." The first tier of the equal protection
analysis is the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review.
56
The second tier is the application of the standard of judicial review to the
classification in question using a means-ends analysis." In declaring statu-
tory caps unconstitutional, most courts apply either strict scrutiny or the
intermediate level of review." In upholding statutory caps, courts consist-
ently apply the lowest level of judicial review, the rational basis test.5 9
55. Sibley, 462 So. 2d at 155; Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 695 (Tex. 1988).
See cases cited supra note 54.
56. The United States Supreme Court has established three primary levels of judicial re-
view: Strict scrutiny applicable to legislation involving a suspect class or an infringement on a
fundamental right; intermediate level of review applicable to legislation involving gender clas-
sifications; and rational basis review, the lowest and most common level of judicial review.
JOHN E. NOWACK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 533-37 (3d ed. 1986). In determining the
appropriate standard of judicial review, judicial inquiry focuses on the existence of a funda-
mental right or suspect classification. Id. at 534 n.54. If the classification involves neither a
fundamental right nor a suspect classification, the court will apply a lowest level of judicial
review, the rational basis test. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40
(1985); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980); see also New York City Transit Auth, v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 572 (1979) (holding that because no suspect class was involved the classification was
rationally related to legislative purpose); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (ap-
plying strict scrutiny to legislation impacting a fundamental right). If a court recognizes a
fundamental right, or a suspect classification, it will apply the heightened level of review
known as strict scrutiny. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (laws involving suspect
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (applying strict scrutiny to a suspect class). If a court recognizes an important substan-
tive right as opposed to a fundamental right, it will apply a heightened level of review adopting
an intermediate level of review. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying
intermediate level of review to gender classification); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830
(N.H. 1980) (applying an intermediate level of review to a right to full recovery). The United
States Supreme Court restricted the application of the intermediate level of review to classifica-
tions involving gender or illegitimacy. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (applying
intermediate level of review to the classification of illegitimate children); Craig, 429 U.S. at 197
(stating that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75
(1971).
57. Sibley, 462 So. 2d at 155; Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 695. See cases cited supra note 54.
58. Jones, 555 P.2d at 399 (applying a rational basis test "with teeth"); see also, Morris v.
Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 777-78 (Ohio 1991) (Sweeney, J., dissenting) (applying strict scrutiny);
Carson, 424 A.2d at 825 (applying an intermediate level of review); Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at
125 (applying an intermediate level of review).
59. Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 771; accord Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir.
1989); Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 787-88 (W.D. Va. 1986), modified, 678 F. Supp. 612
(W.D. Va. 1988) (amending judgement to reflect settlement), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part
and certifying questions to, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming constitutionality of statu-
tory caps); Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S.
892 (1985); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 745-46 (Ill. 1976) (Un-
derwood, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 336 N.E.2d 881, 883
(Ill. 1975)); Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 594 (Ind. 1980); Sibley v.
Statutory Caps
In challenging statutory caps on equal protection grounds, opponents of
the caps argue that statutory caps create discriminatory classifications of vic-
tims and tortfeasors.' Opponents of the caps argue that these discrimina-
tory classifications are unconstitutional because they are not rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose.6' The constitutionality of statutory
caps hinges on the application of the lowest standard of judicial review and
rests on the judicial determination of the nexus between the legislative goal
of easing the medical malpractice crisis and the use of statutory caps as a
means of attaining this goal.
1. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Violate the Equal
Protection Clause
a. Rational Basis Test
Courts in a number of jurisdictions applied the rational basis test to statu-
tory caps.62 In Waggoner v. Gibson,63 the District Court for the Northern
District of Texas applied the traditional rational basis test: Whether there is
a rational relationship between the legislation and the pursuit of a legitimate
state interest. 64 The court held that the statutory cap violated the equal
protection clause under both the state and the federal constitutions because
limitation of recovery for the most deserving victims of malpractice was not
a legitimate state interest.65 Further, the cap served no legitimate state inter-
Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ,, 462 So. 2d 149, 155 (La. 1985); Prendergast v. Nelson,
256 N.W.2d 657, 667-68 (Neb. 1977); Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 695 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting);
Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 534 (Va. 1989).
60. Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 771-72; Carson, 424 A.2d at 830. These classifications include:
(1) medical malpractice victims whose damages exceed the statutory cap and those victims
whose damages do not exceed the cap, Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399, 410
(Idaho 1976); see also Fein, 695 P.2d at 682; Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 741; Morris, 576 N.E.2d at
772; Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 681, 695 (Tex. 1988) (Gonzalez, J. dissenting), (2)
health care tortfeasors and other tortfeasors, Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H.
1980), and (3) medical malpractice victims and other tort victims. Id.; Fein, 695 P.2d at 682;
Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 771.
61. Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 741; see Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (N.D.
Tex. 1986); Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 780 (Sweeney, J., dissenting); Duren v. Suburban Commu-
nity Hosp., 482 N.E.2d 1358, 1362 (Ohio C.P. 1985).
62. Waggoner, 647 F. Supp. at 1106; Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 771; accord Fein, 695 P.2d at
683; Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 745-46 (Underwood, J., dissenting); Sibley, 462 So. 2d at 155;
Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 695 (Gonzalez & Culver, J.J., dissenting); Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 534.
63. 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
64. Id. at 1106.
65. Id. The statutory cap means that a jury may award damages up to the cap for a
slightly injured patient but that a patient who is permanently injured and severely disabled is
entitled to no greater compensation. Id. The slightly injured victim is not affected by the
statute; however, the most severely injured is greatly handicapped by the cap's application. Id.
at 1106 n.8.
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est because no corresponding societal quid pro quo66 existed to replace the
victim's right of full recovery. 67 More importantly, the cap did not ade-
quately compensate patients with meritorious claims and provided no means
of eliminating frivolous claims.6" The court concluded that the detrimental
effect of the cap on the most deserving victims was not vitiated by the exist-
ence of a medical malpractice insurance crisis.69 Thus, the statutory cap did
not meet the rational basis test.70 This reasoning suggests that statutory
caps are not an adequate means of resolving the medical malpractice insur-
ance crisis because caps fail to discourage nonmeritorious claims and force
the most severely injured to bear the burden of the malpractice insurance
crisis.
One court also applied a rational basis test "with teeth.' ' 7 , In Jones v.
State Board of Medicine,72 the Supreme Court of Idaho applied the following
heightened rational basis test: Whether the statute is reasonably related to a
public purpose and whether the establishment of the classification has a fair
and substantial relationship to the achievement of the legislature's objective
or purpose.73 The Jones court remanded the case for the determination of
questions pertinent to the equal protection challenge.74
66. The quid pro quo concept means that the victim or society receives a benefit that
offsets the benefit of limited liability received by health care providers. Wright v. Central Du
Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976) (stating that "loss of recovery potential to
some malpractice victims is offset by lower insurance premiums and lower medical care costs
for all recipients of medical care"); see also Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399, 408-
09 (Idaho 1976) (explaining that quid pro quo means the availability of a reasonable substitute
for the severely injured malpractice victim), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
67. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. at 1106 (citing Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135 (N.D.
1978)); Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 742-43; Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980).
68. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. at 1106-07.
69. Id. at 1107. The court concluded that concerns about the medical profession and the
insurance industry cannot overrun the concern for the victims who are most seriously injured
by malpractice. Id.
70. Id.
71. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399, 410-11 (Idaho 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 914 (1977).
72. 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
73. Id. at 411. The court determined that strict scrutiny was not appropriate because
there was neither a suspect class nor an infringement on the exercise of a fundamental right.
Id. at 410.
74. Id. at 416. The court concluded that there was a medical malpractice insurance crisis
but that insufficient evidence existed on a local level to properly evaluate the constitutional
issue. Id. at 416. The court found that there was an insufficient factual basis regarding the
purported correlation between the statutory caps on a victim's recovery and the promotion of
health care for the people of the state. Id. at 411.
Statutory Caps
b. Intermediate Level of Review
Several courts applied an intermediate level of review to invalidate statu-
tory caps.75 In Carson v. Maurer,76 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
determined that the right to recover damages for personal injury was an
important substantive right.7 7 The court imposed an intermediate level of
review because the right to recover in tort was sufficiently important to re-
quire that restrictions imposed on the right be subjected to a standard of
review more rigorous than the rational basis test.78 The test employed by
the court was whether the classifications created by the statutory cap rest on
"some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the ob-
ject of the legislation.",79 The court held that the necessary "fair and sub-
stantial" relationship between the caps and the legislature's objective80 was
tenous for several reasons.8" First, the damage awards paid by insurance
companies to victims were only a portion of the total insurance premium
costs; second, few individuals actually suffered noneconomic damages in ex-
cess of the cap.82 Most importantly, the recovery limitation did not discour-
75. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978) (quoting Johnson v. Hassett,
217 N.W.2d 771, 775 (N.D. 1974)) (asking whether there is a "close correspondence between
the statutory classification and the legislative goals"). For a related view, see the dissenting
opinion of Justice Mosk in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 694 (Cal.),
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985), which argued that the appropriate level of judicial re-
view was an intermediate level of review because the rational basis test and strict scrutiny
standard were rigid extremes that should be avoided in such an important area. Id. at 695.
For a more expansive approach, see Chief Justice Bird's dissent, in Fein, which formulated a
two-tier intermediate level of review because, in his opinion, the medical malpractice crisis was
over. Id. at 687. Justice Bird asserted that courts should examine medical malpractice legisla-
tion more closely and should not defer to the legislature's resolution of the crisis. Id. at 687-
88.
76. 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
77. Id. at 830.
78. Id. at 830-31. The court found that the right to recover in tort is not a fundamental
right and that the classification of malpractice victims does not involve a suspect class. Id. at
830. Accordingly, strict scrutiny does not apply. Id.
79. Id. at 831. To be justified as a reasonable measure in furthering the public interest and
well-being, the statute must not impose serious restrictions on private rights that outweigh the
benefits conferred upon society. Id.
80. The legislature's goal was the reduction of malpractice insurance rates and the stabili-
zation of insurance risks. Id. at 836. The court noted that statutory caps were intended to
codify and to stabilize the law of medical malpractice and to improve the availability of ade-
quate insurance for health care providers at a reasonable cost. Id. at 830. This goal would be
achieved by ensuring that insurance companies would not compensate victims for
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age or eliminate nonmeritorious claims.8 3 Rather, statutory caps had the
exact opposite effect. Statutory caps failed to adequately compensate the
most severely injured victims who had meritorious claims.84 The court con-
cluded that "[ilt is simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of
supporting the medical care industry solely upon those persons who are
most severely injured and therefore most in need of compensation.
' 5
c. Strict Scrutiny
No court majority applied strict scrutiny in reviewing the constitutionality
of statutory caps. In Morris v. Savoy, 6 Ohio Supreme Court Justice Swee-
ney, in a persuasive dissenting opinion, argued that courts should apply
strict scrutiny 7 because malpractice legislation impinged on the exercise of
the fundamental constitutional right to a jury trial.18 Justice Sweeney fur-
ther argued that the cap on damages violated equal protection because there
was no evidence to show that the cap was reasonably related to the legisla-
tive goal of reducing malpractice insurance rates.89 Thus, the cap could not
83. Id. at 837 (quoting Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135 (N.D. 1978), which
adopted this same reasoning regarding meritorious and nonmeritorious claims).
84. Carson, 424 A.2d at 837; see Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978)
(stating that "[r]estrictions on recovery may encourage physicians to enter into practice and
remain in practice, but do so only at the expense of claimants with meritorious claims").
85. Carson, 424 A.2d at 837. Compare Chief Justice Bird's dissent in Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 690 (Cal.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985), which con-
tended that there was no logical reason why the most severely injured should pay for special
relief to medical tortfeasors and their insurance companies. Id. Chief Justice Bird concluded
that statutory caps were an arbitrary classification and could not be justified on the grounds of
the medical malpractice insurance crisis because the essential purpose of insurance is to spread
the costs of risk over a large number of people so that no one person must bear the burden. Id.
at 690-91. The classification is extremely underinclusive and unconstitutional because the bur-
den falls on the most severely injured medical malpractice victims. Id. at 692.
86. Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 777-78 (Ohio 1991) (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
87. The strict scrutiny test focuses on whether the classification is necessary to further a
compelling state or government interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 781.
88. Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 780-81.
89. Id. at 781. The dissent criticized the majority's logic:
[T]he majority concludes that there is no evidence to show that the . . . [cap] on
medical malpractice damages is rationally related to the achievement of the state's
objective to reduce medical malpractice insurance rates. How then can the majority
conclude, in its equal protection analysis, that the statutory classification created by
... [the cap] rationally furthers a legitimate legislative objective where there is admit-
tedly no evidence to support that conclusion? Further, in its due process analysis,
the majority concludes that... [the cap] is unreasonable and arbitrary. How then
can the majority say, in its equal protection analysis, that [the cap] 'rationally fur-
thers' a legitimate governmental interest?
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further a compelling state interest. 9° Accordingly, Justice Sweeney's dissent
concluded that the cap violated the equal protection clause of both the fed-
eral and the state constitutions.9'
2. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Do Not Violate the Equal
Protection Clause
Courts uniformly applied the rational basis test92 in holding that statutory
caps did not violate the equal protection clause of state or federal constitu-
tions.93 Under rational basis review, many courts determined that statutory
caps on damages are rationally related to the resolution of the medical mal-
practice crisis and that they are rationally related to the goal of providing
reasonable affordable health care to the public.94 Rational basis review de-
mands significant judicial deference to legislative action. 95 As a result courts




92. Courts consistently have held that the right to sue in tort for full recovery of an injury
was not a fundamental right and that malpractice legislation did not involve a suspect classifi-
cation. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 462 So. 2d 149, 157 (La. 1985); Boyd
v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 786-87 (W.D. Va. 1986) (holding that the right to full recovery in
tort is not implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution), modified, 678 F. Supp. 612
(W.D. Va. 1988)(amending judgment to reflect settlement), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part and
certifying questions to, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming the constitutionality of statu-
tory caps in medical malpractice actions). Since there was no suspect class nor infringement
on a fundamental right, the statute must be upheld if it is reasonably related to a valid legisla-
tive purpose. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 786-87; see also Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687,
695 (Tex. 1988) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (stating that the right to sue in tort for an injury was
not a fundamental right); Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 534 (Va. 1989)
(concluding that there was no suspect class and that the classification did not impinge on the
exercise of a fundamental right).
93. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 786-87 (noting that this statutory limitation on recovery was a
classic economic regulation and accordingly was entitled to judicial deference); see Sibley v.
Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 462 So. 2d 149, 155-57 (La. 1985) (stating that a
limitation on recovery was a classic example of economic legislation and accordingly, the legis-
lation would be afforded great deference when evaluating equal protection challenges). See
cases cited supra note 92.
94. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 684 (Cal.), appeal dismissed, 474
U.S. 892 (1985); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 770-71 (Ohio 1991); see also Davis v.
Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1989); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347
N.E.2d 736, 745-46 (Ill. 1976) (Underwood, J., dissenting); Sibley, 462 So. 2d at 156; Williams
v. Kushner, 549 So.2d 294, 305 (La. 1989) (Dixon, J., dissenting); Prendergast v. Nelson, 256
N.W.2d 657, 668 (Neb. 1977); Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 694-95 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting); Ether-
idge, 376 S.E.2d at 534 (reasoning that courts should defer to the legislature's judgment as to
how the malpractice crisis will be best addressed).
95. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 786.
96. Id. at 786; Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 534; Sibley, 462 So. 2d at 156. See cases cited
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In Boyd v. Bulala,97 the District Court for the Western District of Virginia
applied the rational basis test to statutory caps and found the statutory limi-
tation on recovery was a classic economic regulation and entitled to judicial
deference.9" The court reasoned that although facially unfair, the classifica-
tions, created by the malpractice legislation, did not violate equal protection
guarantees.99 The court found that the purpose of the legislation was to
maintain an adequate level of health care services in Virginia by ensuring
that health care providers obtain affordable malpractice insurance. " The
court held that this purpose was a sufficient justification for the discrimina-
tory effect of the legislation.'°' The court compared the burden imposed on
malpractice victims with the burden placed on the welfare families in Dan-
dridge v. Williams,'0 2 and concluded that the burden on malpractice victims
"certainly pass[ed] constitutional muster under the rule of Dandridge."'10 3
The court held that the medical malpractice cap on damages was a rational
means of achieving affordable insurance and of ensuring the availability of
adequate health care for the Commonwealth.' °4
supra notes 92-3. Under this standard, the court's role is not to determine the wisdom of the
act but rather its rational basis. Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 770-71 (noting that the role of the
judiciary is not to act as a super legislature judging the wisdom and desirability of a legislative
policy); Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 695. Equal protection analysis has never been interpreted to
permit the court to strike down legislation because the judiciary disagrees with it or thinks it is
unwise. Fein, 695 P.2d at 684. The court's duty is to prevent invidious discrimination inconsis-
tent with the Constitution. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 695. Courts recognize that the choice be-
tween alternate methods for obtaining an objective is generally within the legislature's
province, Fein, 695 P.2d at 683, and equal protection merely requires that the legislature chose
a method which is rationally related to their permissible objective. See id. at 684.
97. 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986), modified, 678 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va. 1988)
(amending judgment to reflect settlement), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and certifying questions
to, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming constitutionality of caps on medical malpractice
damages).
98. Id. at 786.
99. Id. The law treated victims of malpractice differently from other tort victims and the
law discriminated between those plaintiffs whose losses exceeded the cap and those whose
losses did not. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 397 U.S. 471, 483 (1970). In Dandridge, the Supreme Court upheld Maryland's ad-
ministration of the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program. Under this
need-based program, Maryland limited the total amount of assistance a family could receive,
placing a burden on larger families who would receive the same amount with a larger number
of dependents to use the money. Id.
103. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 787 (W.D. Va. 1986), modified, 678 F. Supp. 612
(W.D. Va. 1988) (amending judgement to reflect settlement), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part
and certifying questions to, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
104. Id.
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3. Summary of Equal Protection Challenges
In conclusion, the standard of review used by courts will determine
whether statutory caps violate equal protection guarantees. In invalidating
statutory caps, courts will often utilize varying degrees of judicial scrutiny as
a result of the concern that the right to recovery, particularly in medical
malpractice actions, is a very important substantive right that should be seri-
ously guarded from infringement. Consequently, courts are reluctant to af-
ford the legislature a high degree of judicial deference. This reluctance is
illustrated by the inconsistent application of the various levels of judicial
scrutiny when reviewing statutory caps under an equal protection analysis.
Opponents of the cap should stress the important substantive right of full
recovery and the burden placed on the most seriously injured. Thus, courts
may be more likely to apply a higher standard of review and strike down the
caps as unconstitutional.
In upholding statutory caps, courts focus on the public need for adequate
health care at a reasonable cost. Accordingly, the courts afford the legisla-
ture significant deference in determining whether statutory caps will ease the
malpractice insurance crisis. Proponents of the caps should argue that these
caps are, in effect, economic legislation aimed at ensuring adequate health
care at a reasonable cost. Accordingly, the court should defer to the legisla-
ture and uphold the statutory caps as constitutional. In reviewing the con-
stitutionality of statutory caps, courts frequently fail to recognize the burden
placed upon the most severely injured and do not determine whether, as a
matter of policy, it is appropriate to shift the burden from the tortfeasor to
the victim.
B. The Due Process Clause
Another common constitutional challenge to statutory caps is under the
due process clause of the state or federal constitution. 105 In reviewing statu-
tory caps under substantive due process, courts consistently apply a reasona-
105. Due process of the law has both substantive and procedural aspects. Substantive due
process guarantees judicial review of government action which interferes or restricts the free-
dom of individual action involving life, liberty or property. NOWACK, supra note 56, at 350.
Substantive due process protects fundamental constitutional rights and voids arbitrary or un-
reasonable limitations on the individual's freedom of action. Id. at 452. Procedural due pro-
cess ensures that an individual is given a right to reasonable notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981); Etheridge v. Medical
Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 530 (Va. 1989). The purpose of procedural due process is to
ensure that adequate procedural safeguards are employed to prevent an arbitrary government
deprivation of constitutionally protected interests. Leis v. Flunt, 439 U.S. 438, 441 (1979);
Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 530.
1993]
352 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 9:337
bleness test:' °6 Whether the legislation is reasonably related to a proper
legislative goal and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.'° 7 Courts, how-
ever, formulate various frameworks in determining whether the statutory
caps are reasonably related to a proper legislative goal. 1o In reviewing pro-
cedural due process challenges to the constitutionality of statutory caps,
courts focus on whether the procedural aspects of notice and hearing are
guaranteed or protected by the legislation.' 9
1. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Violate Substantive Due
Process
In Morris v. Savoy, "0 the Supreme Court of Ohio applied a reasonableness
test and determined that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages violated
the due process clause of the state constitution."' The court held that it was
unreasonable and arbitrary to impose the cost of adequate health care for the
general public on the severely injured victims of medical malpractice."
2
The language of the statute clearly showed that it was aimed at resolving the
medical malpractice crisis by reducing insurance rates." 3 The court cited a
1987 study by the Insurance Service Organization, the rate setting arm of the
106. Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 599 (Ind. 1980); accord Boyd,
647 F. Supp. at 787-88; Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 257 (Kan.
1988) (declaring caps unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause and the "open
courts" provision"); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 462 So. 2d 149, 157 (La.
1985). See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 679-80 (Cal.), appeal dismissed,
474 U.S. 892 (1985); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399, 409 (Idaho 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 770-71 (Ohio 1991); Etheridge,
376 S.E.2d at 530.
107. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 695-6; see Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 530 (holding that substantive
due process tests the reasonableness of a statute with respect to the legislative power to enact
the statute).
108. Substantive due process requires that the legislation be a reasonable means to effectu-
ate a legitimate legislative purpose. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938). Traditionally, substantive due process challenges face a high degree of judicial defer-
ence. Id.; Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 787-88 (W.D. Va. 1986), modified, 678 F. Supp.
612 (W.D. Va. 1988) (amending judgment to reflect settlement), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part
and certifying questions to, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989). Courts will resolve doubts in favor
of the legislation's presumed validity. Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 531 (stating that a statutory
limitation on recovery is an economic regulation afforded judicial deference). Courts have
upheld legislation under the due process clause if there were any facts known or reasonably
inferable to support the legislation. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152. Courts will not over-
turn unwise, impolite, or unjust acts as a violation of substantive due process. Bell, 757 P.2d at
257.
109. Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 530 (Va. 1989).
110. 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991).
111. Id. at 770-71.
112. Id. at 771.
113. Id. at 770.
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insurance industry, that indicated that tort reforms including statutory caps
had little, if any, effect on insurance rates." 4 Thus, the court concluded that
statutory caps were an inappropriate means of stabilizing insurance rates
and that they merely shifted the burden of the insurance crisis from the
health care providers to the health care recipients.'
In determining whether statutory caps satisfy due process requirements,
some courts focused on the availability of an adequate alternative remedy for
the infringement of the common law right to recovery." 6 In Kansas Mal-
practice Victims Coalition v. Bell,' the Supreme Court of Kansas stated
that the legislature may modify common law remedies as dictated by public
policy concerns." 8 The legislature, however, must provide an adequate sub-
stitute remedy, or quid pro quo, for the modification or abolishment of com-
mon law rights or remedies.' The court determined that a medical
malpractice claim fell within the rubric of a common law right because the
foundation for medical malpractice claims was the common law right to re-
covery in negligence cases. 120 In enacting statutory caps, the legislature at-
tempted to substitute the common law right of a remedy with the societal
benefits of a guaranteed recovery against doctors and availability of adequate
health care at a reasonable cost. 121 The court concluded that these substi-
tutes were already available in the state health care laws, and that the legisla-
114. Id. at 771.
115. Id. at 769.
116. The concept of an alternative adequate remedy is known as quid pro quo, or "this for
that." Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 259 (Kan. 1988).
117. 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988).
118. Id. at 260.
119. Id. at 263. For a related view on the modification of a common law right, compare
Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 774 (Ohio 1991) which
articulated a two-prong analysis used when the legislature has modified or abolished a com-
mon law right. A statute violates substantive due process if (1) the modification of a common
law right interferes with a vested property right and (2) the modification does not contain a
permissible legislative objective. Id. at 775. Justice Holmes argued that the cap met both
prongs of the test and, therefore, was not a violation of substantive due process. Id. The
dissent argued that the cap, as a limitation on the recovery of non-economic damages in a
common law cause of action, did not interfere with a vested property right because there was
no vested property right in a common law cause of action. Id. Second, the cap was intended
to achieve a reasonably permissible legislative objective of alleviating the medical malpractice
crisis. Id. Justice Holmes concurred with the state legislature that the caps would prevent
unpredictable jury verdicts and permit insurers and health care providers to adequately assess
rates and the amounts of premiums in order to determine the appropriate amount of coverage
and protection. Id. at 776. Justice Holmes concluded that the discriminatory effect of the cap
was justified because of the resulting stabilization of the malpractice crisis and the ensured
availability of affordable and adequate health care. Id. at 776-77.
120. Bell, 757 P.2d at 258.
121. Id. at 263. This common law right to a remedy is a remedy for all injuries not a few.
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tion provided adequate alternative remedies for the victim.'22 In effect, the
cap forced every medical malpractice victim to make an involuntary contri-
bution to the medical malpractice insurance industry. 2 3 Accordingly, the
court held that the statutory caps on medical malpractice damage awards
infringed upon the common law right to recovery without providing an ade-
quate alternative remedy, or, quid pro quo as is required by due process. 124
Consequently, the statutory cap was struck down as unconstitutional.
2. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Do Not Violate Substantive
Due Process
Courts uniformly applied the reasonableness test in holding that statutory
caps were consistent with substantive due process requirements." 5 In
Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals,126 the Supreme Court of Virginia ap-
plied the reasonableness test and determined that the cap was reasonably
related to the legislature's goal of maintaining adequate health care serv-
ices.'12  The court deferred to the Virginia General Assembly's findings 21
and decision to limit the amount of recovery in medical malpractice cases. 129
Courts also rejected the quid pro quo test as a requirement of substantive
due process. 130 In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,131 the Supreme Court
122. Id. at 263-64.
123. Id. at 264.
124. Id.
125. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 530 (Va. 1989); accord Boyd v.
Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 787-88 (W.D. Va. 1986), modified, 678 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va.
1988) (judgment amended to reflect settlement), and aff'd in part rev'd in part and certifying
questions to, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming constitutionality of caps on medi-
cal malpractice damages); Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 599 (Ind.
1980); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 462 So. 2d 149, 157 (La. 1985). See
supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
126. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
127. Id. at 531.
128. The General Assembly concluded that the escalating costs of medical malpractice
insurance were affecting the availability of insurance and health care. Id. at 531. This was a
substantial problem affecting the public health, safety, and welfare. Id. Accordingly, the Gen-
eral Assembly made a judgment that the statutory caps were an appropriate means of address-
ing this problem. Id. at 527-28.
129. Id. at 531.
130. See Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399, 406 (Idaho 1976) (rejecting the
quid pro quo test of substantive due process and stating that the sole standard of judicial
review for substantive due process challenges was whether the law bears "a [reasonable or]
rational relationship to the preservation and promotion of the public welfare"), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1977); see also Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986), modified, 678
F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va. 1988) (amending judgment to reflect settlement), and aff'd in part,
rev'd in part and certifying questions to, 877 F.2d 1191, 1197 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
quid pro quo argument is based on an unsound premise, citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82-4 (1978), which did not mention quid pro
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of California reasoned that substantive due process did not require that legis-
lation be fair, nor did substantive due process require an adequate quid pro
quo.132 Accordingly, the court concluded that despite the lack of any quid
pro quo, the cap was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of
curbing the medical malpractice crisis. 133 The court noted that the rising
cost of insurance threatened the health care system in the state by limiting
the availability of medical care and threatened to leave physicians unin-
sured. 134 The court reasoned that if there were no reduction in the escalat-
ing insurance costs, plaintiffs might have a difficult time collecting
judgments for any damages against judgment-proof, uninsured doctors.
135
Thus, it was in the public interest to reduce insurance costs by limiting
noneconomic damages.
13 6
In Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hospital,1 37 the Supreme Court of Indiana
rejected the argument that limitation upon recovery created an irrebuttable
presumption that a victim's loss never exceeded the cap, and precluded the
victim from proving otherwise. 138 The court held that a "statute cannot
survive a due process challenge if it denies rights and benefits on the basis of
facts presumed to exist and to be true, without affording the individual an
opportunity to defend those facts."1 3' The court concluded that the cap
neither created such an evidentiary presumption nor forced the trier of fact
to infer that the patient's damages were less than the statutory cap.'4° Re-
covery of damages was limited by a state policy not as the result of an evi-
dentiary presumption. 41 Accordingly, the cap did not violate substantive
due process.
14 2
quo as a necessary requirement of substantive due process guarantees); Davis v. Omitowoju,
883 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding no merit in due process or equal protection challenges by
adopting the reasoning of Boyd).
131. 695 P.2d 665 (Cal.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
132. Id. at 679.
133. Id. at 680.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 681.
136. Id.
137. 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980).
138. Id. at 599.
139. Id.; Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973).
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3. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Do Not Violate Procedural
Due Process
In Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospital,143 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the cap did not violate procedural due process because the cap had
no effect on the right to a decision based upon the merits of each individual
case and that the plaintiff was not denied reasonable notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. 1" The plaintiff argued that because the statute
effectively preordained the result of a hearing, she was thereby denied due
process. 4 ' The court rejected this argument and determined that the plain-
tiff was not denied reasonable notice or a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. 146 Specifically, the court found that the cap neither created a pre-
sumption that a plaintiff's damages could not exceed the cap nor created any
presumptions regarding the individual merits of the plaintiff's medical mal-
practice claim. 14  The cap only affected the parameters of available reme-
dies after the court or jury determined the merits of the case.148
Accordingly, the cap did not violate procedural due process guarantees.
4. Summary of Due Process Arguments
Under the due process clause, successfully challenging statutory caps on
either procedural or substantive grounds is very difficult. Under a substan-
tive due process challenge, courts consistently apply the reasonableness test,
affording the legislature a high degree of judicial deference. Proponents of
the cap should stress the reasonable relationship between the cap and the
predictability of the rate structure and premiums once the possibility of high
erratic jury awards has been eliminated. Opponents of the cap should pro-
vide quantitative evidence that statutory caps have little impact on the medi-
cal malpractice crisis in order to undercut the presumption of the
legislation's validity and to undermine the "reasonable" relationship be-
tween statutory caps and the malpractice crisis. Invalidation of statutory
caps as a violation of procedural due process is highly unlikely unless the
effect of the statutory cap preempts the jury's determination of the merits of
the medical malpractice cause of action.
143. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
144. Id. at 531.
145. Id. at 530.
146. Id. at 531.
147. Id. at 530-31.
148. Id. at 531.
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C Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial
While due process and equal protection arguments focus on the level of
scrutiny in determining the constitutionality of caps, Seventh Amendment' 49
challenges focus on the interpretation of the scope of the jury's function.
The Seventh Amendment 5° embodies this nation's commitment to an indi-
vidual's right to a trial by jury.' 5 ' To be meaningful, the Seventh Amend-
ment must protect the ability of the jury to make a difference in the outcome
of the trial through its determination of damages. 152 Whether the statutory
caps restrict the jury's function as the fact-finding body hinges on the inter-
pretation of the scope of the jury's role and the weight afforded the right to a
trial by jury.
1. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Violate the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial
In Boyd v. Bulala,'5 a the District Court for the Western District of Vir-
ginia held that the statutory cap violated the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial when proven damages exceeded the amount of the cap. 154 When a
court refused to enter judgment for the full amount of a verdict which ex-
ceeded the cap, the court essentially invalidated a jury fact-finding.' 55 By
limiting the jury's determination of fact, the court limited the role of the
jury. 156 Thus, the cap violated the Seventh Amendment because it restricted
the jury's function as the trier of fact. 5"
149. The Seventh Amendment states: "In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
150. The Seventh Amendment aims to preserve the substance of the common law right to a
trial by jury by distinguishing the province of the court and that of the jury. Boyd v. Bulala,
672 F. Supp. 915, 919 (W.D. Va. 1987), modified, 678 F. Supp. 612, 619 (W.D. Va.1988), and
aff'd in part, rev'd in part and certifying questions to, 677 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989)
(affirming constitutionality of caps on medical malpractice damages). The jury's traditional
role is to decide issues of fact including the assessment of damages. Kansas Malpractice Vic-
tims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 258 (Kan. 1988); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 778
(Ohio 1991).
151. Boyd, 672 F. Supp. at 918.
152. Id. at 920-21. Thus, the jury's assessment of damages falls within the protection of the
Seventh Amendment. Id. at 920.
153. 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986), modified, 678 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va. 1988)
(amending judgment to reflect settlement), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part and certifying ques-
tions to, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming constitutionality of statutory caps).
154. 672 F. Supp. 915, 919 (W.D. Va. 1987).
155. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 788.
156. Id. at 788-89.
157. Id. at 789. In Boyd, the court noted that the legislature may pass measures which
impact the way a jury determines factual issues. Id. For example, the legislature may enact
1993]
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The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, without discussing the dis-
trict court's reasoning, reversed the district court holding that the cap did
not violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.158 The court of
appeals reasoned that although the jury acted as a fact-finder in its determi-
nation of damages, the jury does not ascertain the legal consequences of its
factual findings. 15 9 Such a conclusion is within the legislature's province."
Accordingly, the court of appeals found that the cap was a legal consequence
of the jury's determination of liability. The court concluded that once the
jury made its factual findings with respect to damages, it fulfilled its constitu-
tional function.161 This single case illustrates that the constitutionality of
the cap based on the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial hinges on the
court's interpretation of the scope of the jury's role and function.
2. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Do Not Violate the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial
In Davis v. Omitowoju, 162 the plaintiff argued that the district court, in
enforcing the statutory cap on the jury verdict, reexamined a fact determined
by the jury which is contrary to the second clause of the Seventh Amend-
ment. 163  The court concluded that the framers' intent was to preclude
judges from reexamining the facts determined by the jury."6 The Seventh
Amendment, however, does not prohibit legislatures from making a rational
policy decision in the public interest which may, in effect, reexamine a jury's
findings of fact. 165 Although the cap, as a legislative measure, effectively re-
examined a factual determination by the jury, it did not violate the Seventh
Amendment prohibition against judiciary reexamination of jury fact
findings.
rules of procedure, rules of evidence, and may allocate burdens of proof. Id. The legislature,
however, may not preempt jury findings on a factual issue which has properly been submitted
to the jury. Id. at 789-90. The legislature was prohibited from dictating the amount of a
judgment to be entered into at trial. Id. at 790. This course of conduct by the legislature
would infringe upon the proper functioning of the judiciary and violate the separation of pow-
ers doctrine. Id. Accordingly, the court found that the cap violated the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial.




162. 883 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1989)
163. Id. at 1159. See supra note 149. The second clause of the Seventh Amendment guar-
antees protection from a biased judiciary by providing that the fact-finding of a jury is final.
Davis, 883 F.2d at 1164.
164. Id. at 1165.
165. Id.
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3. Summary of Seventh Amendment Arguments
In conclusion, the court's interpretation of the scope of the right to a jury
trial will determine the constitutionality of statutory caps under the Seventh
Amendment. If the court interprets the right narrowly, the court may up-
hold the cap concluding that the statutory cap is applied only after the jury
has reached its verdict and corresponding recovery. Consequently, the im-
position of a cap does not infringe upon the jury's function as trier of fact.
If, however, the court interprets the jury's role more broadly, the court may
declare the cap unconstitutional as a violation of the Seventh Amendment.
By refusing to enter judgment in the amount of the jury verdict, the court, in
essence, invalidates the jury's determination of fact.
Legislatures have largely ignored the overriding policy concern of whether
medical malpractice actions are suitable for jury determinations. Commen-
tators have suggested that medical malpractice actions are not suitable for
jury determinations because of the increasing body of technical medical
knowledge used in malpractice actions.166 Medical malpractice actions
often contain complex issues that exceed the expertise of the jury or judge.' 67
Thus, the role of expert testimony becomes paramount in adequately educat-
ing the jury in order to make them competent to decide the facts.' 68 The
crux of the problem is whether the experts can ever adequately educate the
jury in order to render a competent decision. 169 The traditional benefits of
the right to a jury trial are destroyed when a jury is unable to competently
decide factual issues. 7o Therefore, the crux of the argument for the right to
a jury trial is not the limitation on recovery imposed by a statutory cap but
rather whether the jury can competently determine the complex factual is-
sues in a medical malpractice action.
D. State Constitutional Challenges
Opponents of caps utilize four grounds to challenge statutory caps as a
violation of state constitutional provisions. These approaches are the "open
courts" provision, the prohibition against "special legislation," the right to a
jury trial, and the separation of powers doctrine.
166. Paglia, supra note 45, at 59.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 60.
170. Id.
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1. "Open Courts" Provision
17 1
a. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Violate the "Open
Courts" Provision
In Lucas v. United States,172 the Supreme Court of Texas held that statu-
tory caps violated the "open courts" provision of the Texas Constitution.
17 3
The court utilized a two prong analysis whereby the litigant must show (1)
that he had a cognizable common law cause of action which was being re-
stricted by the legislation, and (2) that the restriction was unreasonable or
arbitrary when balanced against the statute's purpose and basis. 174  The
court concluded that victims of medical malpractice had a cognizable com-
mon law cause of action because their claim was based on an action for
negligently inflictedharm. 17  The court focused the inquiry on the second
prong,'7 6 holding that the restriction was unreasonable and arbitrary be-
cause the statute failed to provide an adequate substitute redress for the vic-
tim. 17 7 A societal quid pro quo 178 was insufficient.179 There must be an
individual quid pro quo.' ° The statute cannot be sustained by alleged bene-
fits to society as a whole.'' The court stated that it was unreasonable and
arbitrary to limit the recovery of the most severely injured victims to deter-
171. The "open courts" provision guarantees the right of access to the courts. Arancibia,
supra note 1, at 149.
An open courts provision typically states: The courts of justice of the State shall be
open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and
for every injury to person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial, delay or prejudice.
Id. at 149 n.125.
172. 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
173. Id. at 691. Article I, § 13 of the Texas Constitution, the "open courts" provision,
provides two separate constitutional guarantees. Id. at 696. First, the clause that "all courts
shall be open" guarantees the right to access. Id. Second, the clause that "every person...
shall have remedy for injury by due course of law" guarantees the right to redress. Id.
174. Id. at 690; see also Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1103, 1108-09 (N.D. Tex. 1986)
(noting that the same two requirements in the "open courts" provision).
175. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 690.
176. Id. at 691.
177. Id. at 690.
178. This quid pro quo has been defined as the loss of potential recovery to medical mal-
practice victims offset by lower insurance premiums and lower medical care costs for all recipi-
ents of medical care. Id.
179. Id.
180. The court noted that two jurisdictions that upheld damage caps provided alternative
remedies such as a Patient Compensation Fund. Id. The court also noted that the legislature
had the opportunity to create a Patient Compensation Fund to serve as an alternative remedy.
Id. at 691. This suggests that the opinion may actually hinge on the quid pro quo argument
and the existence of alternate remedies for the medical malpractice victims.
181. Id. at 690; see also Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1108 (N.D. Tex. 1986)
(concluding that "[t]here is, effectively, no forum to which an injured party may appeal for
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mine whether liability insurance rates would decrease.1"2 It was also found
to be unreasonable and arbitrary for the legislature to apply damage caps to
the most severely injured with the goal of assuring a rational relationship




In Lucas, the court stated that the right of access to courts must be ana-
lyzed in conjunction with the right to trial by jury."8 4 The court reasoned
that the access to courts provision was designed to provide a means of re-
dress for injuries.'." A plaintiff who received a jury verdict which was even-
tually capped has not received a constitutional redress of injuries because the
legislature arbitrarily capped the recovery. 18 6 Thus, a cap on a jury verdict
denied the individual the benefit of a jury trial. '8 7 The court concluded that
"[i]t is simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of supporting
the medical care industry solely upon those persons who are most severely
injured and therefore most in need of compensation."188
In Waggoner v. Gibson,'"9 the District Court for the Northern District of
Texas analyzed the "open courts" provision of the Texas Constitution 
90 in a
recompense of serious injuries due to malpractice; the legislature provides no adequate substi-
tute to replace the traditional common law right of recovery").
182. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex. 1988); see Waggoner v. Gibson,
647 F. Supp. 1102, 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that a limit on the amount of recovery
available to malpractice victims unreasonably displaces the common law cause of action when
balanced against the purpose of the statute).
183. The court cited an independent study which concluded that no relationship existed
between a damage cap and the increase in insurance rates. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 691. The
court noted that less than .6% of all medical malpractice claims brought were for over the
statutory cap of $100,000. Id. This suggests that the medical malpractice crisis was created
not by high damage awards but by the mere increase in the number of claims brought.




188. Id. at 692 (quoting Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980)). For a related
view, see Chief Justice Dixon's dissent in Williams v. Kushner, 549 So. 2d 294, 304 (La. 1989),
which also asserted that statutory caps do not comport with the fundamental principles of the
right to adequate remedy and the right to an open court. Id. at 311. Chief Justice Dixon
reasoned that the recovery of damages is based on evidence; whereas, the valuation of damages
is based on the trier of fact's discretion. Id. at 310-11. Chief Justice Dixon argued that the
statutory cap on damages removes the individual discretionary element inherent in the valua-
tion of damages. Id. at 311. He concluded that the discretionary element is replaced with a
legislative determination of an adequate remedy. Id. Accordingly, the dissenting opinion
concluded that the adequacy of a remedy in relation to the actual loss sustained is determined
.by considering both the evidence presented and individual discretion. Id.
189. 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1108 (N.D. Texas 1986).
190. Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution mandates that "all courts be open, and
every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law." Waggoner, 647 F. Supp. at 1108.
1.1993]
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due process framework utilizing a three prong test.' 9 ' The court concluded
that the statutory cap satisfied all three prongs. 192 First, the limitation on
the damage recovery of malpractice victims was a restriction on a common
law cause of action. 93 Second, the restriction was arbitrary and unreasona-
ble when balanced against the purpose of limiting recovery to the most de-
serving malpractice victims. 94 Third, the legislature failed to provide
adequate substitute remedies to replace the right to recovery modified by the
application of statutory caps.' 95 The court concluded that the cap failed to
provide even a societal quid pro quo because the cap did not adequately
compensate the most severely injured malpractice victims nor did it provide
a mechanism to eliminate or to prevent nonmeritorious claims.' 96 Thus, the
court held that the cap was unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution's
"open courts" provision."
b. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Do Not Violate the
"Open Courts" Provision
In evaluating statutory caps as a violation of the "open courts" provision
and the corresponding "right to redress clauses" of state constitutions,
courts focused on the quid pro quo argument delineated in Lucas v. United
States.'98 In Jones v. State Board of Medicine,1 99 the Supreme Court of
Idaho rejected the argument that the right to remedy was inviolate and that
the legislature may only amend common law remedies if they provide substi-
tute procedures or alternate remedies. 2° The court reasoned that this argu-
ment would prevent alteration of common law rights governing the public
health, safety, and welfare without constitutional amendment. 20 ' The "right
to remedy" provision of the constitution did not explicitly prohibit legisla-
tive modifications of common law actions.2 °2 Accordingly, the court found
191. Id. A statute or law violates the "open courts" provision if (1) a cognizable common
law cause of action is being restricted, (2) the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary when
balanced against the legislation's objective and purpose, and (3) if the legislation modifies a
common law cause of action, an adequate substitute must be provided. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. The court stated that "[i]t is impossible for a seriously injured victim of malprac-
tice to obtain any recompense above the statutory maximum for his or her injuries". Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1106-07.
197. Id. at 1108.
198. 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988). See generally supra notes 172-188 and accompanying
text.
199. 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).




that the legislature could modify the right to remedy without providing a
corresponding quid pro quo.20 3 Thus the court held that the statutory cap
did not violate the "open courts" provision of the state constitution.2
Courts also analyzed the right of access in the "open courts" provision
within a procedural due process framework.2 °5 In Sibley v. Board of Super-
visors of Louisiana State University,2 ° 6 the plaintiff argued that the "open
courts" provision should be interpreted as requiring an unrestricted rem-
edy.20 7 The Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected this argument stating that
a legislature may modify access to the judiciary system as long as the mea-
sure was not totally arbitrary and was not essential to the exercise of a fun-
damental constitutional right.20 8 The court found that the right to sue for
damages caused by medical malpractice was not a fundamental right; and
that the cap was subject to the lesser standard of reasonableness.20 9 The
court concluded that the "limitation of liability on medical malpractice
claims is at least reasonably related to the state's attempt to minimize the
costs and maintain its medical services to the citizens of Louisiana at low or
no costs."
2 10
c. Summary of "Open Court" Provisions Arguments
In conclusion, the success of challenges based upon the state "open
courts" provision hinges on whether the court accepts or rejects the need for
an alternative remedy for the modification of the right to access. Without a
reasonable alternate remedy, some courts will prohibit modification or abol-
203. Id.
204. Id. at 404-05. For a related view, see Justice Gonzalez's dissent in Lucas v. United
States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 693 (Tex. 1988), which rejected the existence of a quid pro quo as a
constitutional prerequisite for substantive due process. Id. The opinion argued that the quid
pro quo element was a factor in determining whether a scheme denies the right of redress
unreasonably and is not the sole test. Id. at 697. An individual quid pro quo is unnecessary if
a societal quid pro quo exists. Id. Justice Gonzalez concluded that there was both an individ-
ual quid pro quo and a societal quid pro quo. Id. The societal quid pro quo was the predict-
ability of the rate structures, resulting in a decrease in the cost of medical malpractice
insurance premiums and the increase in the availability of health care. Id. The individual quid
pro quo was that health care providers can obtain adequate insurance coverage because victims
may recover against an insolvent judgment proof health care provider. Id. In light of this, the
dissenting opinion argued that the cap was constitutional and did not violate the "open courts"
provision.
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ishment of the right of access, guaranteed by the "open courts" provision.2 '
Other courts will not require an alternative remedy or quid pro quo because
this would deprive the legislature of its power to modify defects in common
law doctrines in response to changing circumstances in society.2" 2 If the-
court requires a quid pro quo for the legislature's modification of a common
law right to access, proponents of the cap should stress the societal and indi-
vidual quid pro quo. Opponents of the cap should stress that individual
plaintiffs do not receive any new remedies for the limitation on their dam-*
ages. If the court' rejects a quid pro quo requirement, proponents'of the cap
must argue that the cap does not completely abolish the right of access and
right of redress, but rather only partially restricts these rights. Most impor-
tantly, proponents should stress the need for legislative flexibility to enact
measures to promote the public health, safety, and welfare due to changing
circumstances. The legislature should have the power to remedy the defects
in the common law. Opponents of the cap should stress the unreasonable-
ness of the cap.
The "open courts" provision of state constitutions effectively serves the
same functions as the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Conceptually, the two clauses are similar. Thus, litigants may also utilize
successful due process arguments.
2. "Special Privilege" or "Special Law" Clause
213
a. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Violate "Special Law"
or "Special Privilege" Clause
In Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association,21 4 the Supreme Court
of Illinois held that the cap was a "special law"2 5 which violated the equal
211. Arancibia, supra note 1, at 149.
212. Id. This limit on the legislature's power would create a judiciary with massive policy
making authority. Id.
213. The "special privilege" clause prohibits the granting of special privileges or
immunities to an individual or a class of individuals. Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 782
(Ohio 1991) (Sweeney, J., dissenting). The "special privilege" provision prevents the law from
"bestowing favors on preferred groups or localities." Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d
399, 416 (Idaho 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). A law is general and not a "special
law" or "special privilege," if "all persons subject to it are treated alike as to privileges,
protection and in every other respect." Id. A law is not special if all persons who are
subjected to it are treated similarly with respect to privileges and liabilities. Id. at 416-17.
214. 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976)
215. A "special law" is a law that applies specifically to a class of individuals or is designed
for a particular purpose. Board of County Comm'rs v. Swensen, 327 P.2d 361, 362 (Idaho
1958). A "special privilege" is granted to the health care providers as a class. Wright, 347
N.E.2d at 743.
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protection clause of the state constitution. 2 6 The societal quid pro quo 2 17
failed to make the classification reasonable under the rationale of the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act,218 which limited the monetary recovery of
employees for employment-related injuries. 2 9 The Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act provided a quid pro quo whereby the employer assumes liability
without fault and is relieved of the prospect of high damage awards..
220
"[T]he employee, whose monetary reward was limited, was awarded com-
pensation without regard to the employer's negligence. '221  This quid pro
quo, however, did not extend to the most seriously injured victims of medi-
cal malpractice when statutory caps apply.222 Statutory caps limited the vic-
tims recovery without reducing the burden of proof, abolishing common law
defenses, or altering the essential elements of the medical malpractice ac-
tion.223 The recovery of damages by the most severely injured was denied on
an arbitrary basis when statutory caps were imposed and an unconstitutional
special privilege of limited liability was granted to health care providers.224
Accordingly, the court found the cap an unconstitutional special law which
violated the equal protection clause of the state constitution.225
b. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Do Not Violate the
"Special Law" or "Special Privilege" Clause
In Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals,226 the plaintiff argued that the
cap granted special privileges and immunities to health care providers and
their insurers while simultaneously discriminating arbitrarily between the se-
verely injured and the less severely injured. 227  The "special legislation"
216. Id. at 743.
217. A few individuals must give up the right to damages in order to achieve cheaper
medical care for the public-good. Id. at 742.
218. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.1-138.28 (1975).
219. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (11. 1976); see also
Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980) (stating that the state Workmen's Compen-
sation Act does not support the finding that the cap, as a limitation on damage recovery, is
constitutional and that Workmen's compensation acts provide a quid pro quo for the tort
victims whose common law right of full recovery is limited by statutory law).




224. Id. at 742-43; see Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474, 479 (Ill. 1972) (holding that if
recovery is permitted or denied on an arbitrary basis, a special privilege is granted in violation
of the state constitution).
225. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976). There was
no acceptable quid pro quo for the limitation on an individual's right to full recovery. Id.
226. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
227. Id. at 532-33; see also Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 668-69 (Neb. 1977)
(holding that the cap, which was a special privilege, was only unconstitutional if wholly irrele-
19931
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clause of the Virginia Constitution permits laws to apply to a single class as
long as that class is reasonable in relation to the purported legislative
goal.228 The court held that the test was whether the classification, created
by the special privilege, bore a reasonable and substantial relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the legislation.229 The Supreme Court of
Virginia concluded that the classification applied to all persons within the
classification equally and without distinction.2 30  All malpractice victims
whose damages exceeded the statutory cap were treated equally; their dam-
age awards were reduced. Accordingly, the court held that the cap did not
violate the "special legislation" provision.
2 31
c. Summary of "Special Privilege" or "Special Law" Arguments
Conceptually, the "special privilege" or "special law" clause of state con-
stitutions is similar to equal protection guarantees of the federal Constitution
because the analysis focuses on whether a special privilege is unreasonably
granted to a particular class of individuals. Accordingly, litigants may util-
ize successful equal protection arguments. Proponents of the cap should ar-
gue that the cap is reasonably related to the medical malpractice insurance
crisis. Opponents of the cap should stress the unreasonableness of granting
limited liability to health care providers by regulating the recovery of the
most severely injured victims. The constitutionality of the cap will hinge on
the judiciary's evaluation of the reasonableness of the legislation in light of
all the particular facts and circumstances.
vant to the achievement of a state's objective; the cap was not unconstitutional because the
procedure was elective and the act guaranteed the victim an assured Patient Compensation
Fund of $500,000 for the payment of any malpractice claim).
228. Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 533. More importantly, persons within the class must be
treated similarly. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. For a similar opinion see Justice Gonzalez's dissent in Lucas v. United States, 757
S.W.2d 687, 693 (Tex. 1988), which concluded that damage caps were not special laws because
such legislation applied uniformly to all who come within the classification established by the
legislation. Id. at 700.
231. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 N.E.2d 525, 533 (Va. 1989). For a contrasting
view, see the dissent of Justice Russell in Etheridge, which concluded that the cap offended the
prohibition against special laws in the state constitution. Id. at 536. Justice Russell asserted
that statutory caps created a class of health care providers with a special privilege: Their liabil-
ity was limited to the statutory cap. Id. All health care providers who did not fall within this
class must pay the full amount of a jury verdict. Id. Moreover, the statutory cap also created
a disfavored class of seriously injured victims whose damages were not fully recoverable. Id.
Justice Russell asserted that the "special law" provision was aimed at destroying this kind of
economic favoritism. Id. at 537.
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3. Right to a Jury Trial2
32
1. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Violate the Right to a
Jury Trial
In Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Association,233 the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama held that the statutory cap imposed an impermissible burden on the
right to a jury trial that is guaranteed by the state constitution.234 The court
explained that the jury determination of the amount of damages was the very
essence of the fundamental constitutional right to a trial by jury.235 The
court concluded that the determination of damages was within the discretion
and judgment of the jury alone. 236 The imposition of a cap effectively bound
the jury's discretion. 237 A limitation on the jury's discretion, other than by
instruction as to the circumstances whereby damages are to be awarded, vio-
lated the constitutional right of trial by jury.2 3' Thus, the cap effectively
invalidated the jury's function once damages exceeded the cap.2 39 The court
explained that the jury's function was less than advisory when the cap was
automatically and absolutely imposed on the verdict. 2 ' The court con-
cluded that this infringement on the right to a trial by jury violated the man-
dates of section 11 of the state constitution. 241
In Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell,2 42 the Supreme Court of
Kansas analyzed the right to a jury trial under a due process framework.24 3
Because due process requires that statutory modifications of the right to a
jury trial be "reasonably necessary in the public interest to promote the gen-
232. Statutory caps were also challenged under the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the
state constitution. Many state constitutions provide that the right to trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 159 (Ala. 1991); Kansas
Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 258 (Kan. 1988); Morris v. Savoy, 576
N.E.2d 765, 778 (Ohio 1991); Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 528 (Va.
1989) (holding the right to a trial by jury to be sacred). This right is a valuable and substantial
right that should be closely guarded against infringement. Bell, 757 P.2d at 258. The
traditional role of the jury is the determination of fact which includes the assessment of
damages. Id.
233. 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991).
234. Id. at 164. Article I, § 11 of the Alabama Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"That the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
235. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 161 (Ala. 1991).
236. Id. at 160.
237. Id. at 161.
238. Id. at 162.
239. Id. at 163.
240. Id.
241. Id. See supra note 243.
242. 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988).
243. Id. at 259.
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eral welfare of the people of the state," 2 the legislative means must have a
real and substantial relation to the purported objective.245 This due process
requirement may be met by providing alternative remedies, i.e., a quid pro
quo.24 6 The defendant argued that the statutory caps provided a quid pro
quo:24 7 Lower health care costs when doctors save money on their insurance
and pass the savings onto their patients; more doctors practicing medicine
resulting in greater availability of health care; and compensation for dam-
ages and the diminution, offear of judgment-proof uninsured physician.24
The court explained that statutory caps simply failed to provide any addi-
tional assurance of compensation for the medical malpractice victim.249 The
court determined that the asserted benefits did not outweigh the restriction
imposed on the right to a trial by jury.25° The substitute remedy offered by
statutory caps was inadequate for seriously injured victims and that the caps
denied them their right to trial by jury.25'
In Bell, the court concluded that the statutory caps effectively acted as a
compulsory preestablished remittitur.25 2 Through the application of caps,
plaintiffs were forced-to forego a portion of awarded damages without their
consent.25a With statutory caps, victims were not given the option of a re-
duced jury verdict or a new trial. Victims were obligated to accept judgment
for the reduced jury verdict and the caps arbitrarily limited the factual deter-
mination of damages by the jury.254 The court reasoned that "[n]o verdict is
right which more than compensates - and none is right which fails to com-
pensate. ' 255 Here, the caps were unconstitutional because they failed to
compensate the most severely injured. The court concluded that because
noneconomic damages were so difficult to calculate with mathematical cer-
tainty, the only appropriate standard was the amount a reasonable person







250. Id. at 259-60.
251. Id. at 260.
252. Id. Damages for personal injury are to be reduced by a remittitur only when damages
do not reflect the evidence provided and the plaintiff has the option of accepting the remittitur
or asking for a new trial. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. (quoting Domann v. Pence, 325 P.2d 321 (Kan. 1958)).
256. Id. at 260.
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have entrusted this duty of thereasonable person to the jury.2" Essentially,
the cap undermined the reasonable person standard. For these reasons, the
court held that the cap was unconstitutional.
2. Jurisdictions Holding that Statutory Caps Do Not Violate the
Right to a Jury Trial ;
In Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals,258 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia concluded that statutory caps did not violate the right to a jury trial
because the role of the jury was limited to ascertaining facts and assessing
damages. 259 The court reasoned that statutory caps merely established the
outer limits of a remedy and that this determination was a matter of law.2"
The application of a cap was also an issue of law not an issue of fact and it
was the judiciary's role to apply the law to the facts.261 The court concluded
that the trial court imposed the cap on the assessment of damages only after
the jury had fulfilled its fact-finding function.2 6 2 The court explained that
while a party had the right to have a jury determine damages, the party did
not have the right to have a jury dictate the legal consequences of the dam-
ages calculation.26 3 A trial court dictates the legal consequences of the rem-
edy. Accordingly, the court held that the cap did not infringe upon the right
to a jury trial because the limitation on the remedy was imposed after the
jury had completed its fact-finding.2 "
In Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hospital Inc.,265 the plaintiffs argued that the
cap violated the right to a jury trial because the cap removed the determina-
tion of damages from the jury. 26 6 The plaintiffs' premise was that the right
to trial by jury included the right to have the jury determine all damages.2 67
The Supreme Court of Indiana rejected this argument because the cap was
applied only after the jury reached its verdict and therefore, the issue of
damages was fully adjudicated by the trier of fact. 268 The cap did not de-
stroy the jury's resolution of a justiciable controversy, since the right to have
the jury assess damages remained available. Accordingly, the cap did not
257. Id.
258. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
259. Id. at 529.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. The court noted that without question, a jury's fact-finding function includes the
assessment of damages. Id.
263. Id. at 529.
264. Id.
265. 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980).
266. Id. at 601.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 602.
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violate the right to a jury trial because the substance of that right remained
protected.269
3. Summary of a Right to a Jury Trial Arguments
The argument for the right to a jury trial hinges on the interpretation of
the scope of the jury's role and the weight afforded the right to a jury trial.
In invalidating statutory caps, courts focus on the substance of the right to a
jury trial: the jury's determination of the facts including its assessment of
damages. Opponents of the cap should emphasize the substance of the right
to trial by jury. They should assert that the arbitrary and absolute imposi-
tion of a cap effectively undercuts the substance of the right to a trial by jury.
The substance of the right is preserved if the valuation of damages is less
than the cap. The jury's assessment of damages over the cap, however, is
essentially meaningless.
In upholding statutory caps, courts focus on the form of the right to a jury
trial. The imposition of the cap does not infringe upon the jury's function as
trier of fact because the cap is applied only after the jury has reached its
verdict and calculated damages. Courts also draw a distinction between the
assessment of damages by the jury and the legal consequence of a remedy.
The actual factual determination of damages is within the province of the
jury; the issue of damages as a remedy is a legal issue within the province of
the court. The right to a jury trial is preserved if the jury is permitted to
assess damages. Proponents of the cap should stress that the cap is applied
only after the jury has decided the case on its individual merits and assessed
damages. Thus, the jury has completed its fact-finding function.
4. Separation of Powers270
In Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals,27 the plaintiff argued that the
cap interfered with the powers of the court to enforce judgments, and conse-
quently, the cap circumscribed the discretion of the judiciary. 272 The plain-
tiff contended that the courts actually became ministerial agents of the
legislature.273 The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this argument and
stated that the legislature had the power to provide, to modify, or to repeal a
269. Id.
270. The separation of powers doctrine requires that the legislature, the executive branch,
and the judiciary exercise separate and distinct powers and forbids one branch from employing
powers belonging to one of the others. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 532
(Va. 1989).
271. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
272. Id. at 532.
273. Id.
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remedy. 274 The enactment of a limitation on a common law right of recov-
ery was clearly within the legislature's power.275 Thus, the court held that
the statutory cap was a modification of the common law. 6 More impor-
tantly, if the court entered an award in excess of the cap, the court would be
violating the doctrine of separation of powers by invading the province of
the legislature that had enacted the statutory cap.277 Accordingly, the court
held that statutory caps did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers
and were constitutional.
III. THE HEALTH CARE LIABILITY REFORM AND QUALITY OF CARE
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1992
On July 2, 1992, President Bush submitted the Health Care Liability Re-
form and Quality of Care Improvement Act of 1992 ("the Health Care Bill")
to Congress for enactment. 278 The stated purpose of the bill was to stem the
cost of health care caused by medical malpractice.279 President Bush noted
the need for such an act because "the access to quality care for significant
portions of the population has been threatened., 2 0 The Health Care Bill
sets forth the following significant findings: (1) The rising costs of malprac-
tice insurance, litigation, and liability are escalating the cost of health care;
(2) the malpractice crisis is creating tensions between the medical and legal
professions as well as between the insurance industry and consumers; and (3)
doctors are practicing unnecessary defensive medicine and cancelling high-
risk procedures and specialties due to fear of malpractice suits. 281' The
Health Care Bill suggests that health care reforms would reduce the inci-
dence of medical malpractice and would improve the effectiveness of the
civil system.282 In turn, frivolous claims of health care malpractice would






278. H.R. Doc. No. 84, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See supra note 13. With the election
of Bill Clinton as President in November 1992, the status of this bill is unknown. Yet, it
should be considered by First Lady Hillary Rodman Clinton in her health care reform
package.
279. Id.; see also 138 CONG. REC. H5976-07 (daily ed., July 2, 1992); 138 CONG. REC.
S9772-02 (daily ed., July 2, 1992)(Message from President Bush to Senate and the House of
Representatives).
280. 138 CONG. REC. H5976-07 (daily ed. July 2, 1992); 138 CONG. REC. S9772-02 (daily
ed. July 2, 1992) (Message from President Bush to Senate and the House of Representatives).
281. H.R. 3037, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101(b)-101(d) (1991).
282. Id. §§ 101(d)-101(e).
283. Id. § 101(f).
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Title II of the Health Care Bill, outlines health care liability reforms.2"4
Section 204 places a limitation on noneconomic damages.285 The limit of
$250,000 is applied to any and all health care actions.286 The cap is imposed
against all plaintiffs and defendants whose cause of action arises out of, or is
caused by, the same personal injury or death.28 7 The most significant provi-
sion is that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, for good cause,
may waive the statutory cap requirement. 288 The waiver authority is limited
and is intended to be used sparingly.2"' The invalidation of the caps as a




The Health Care bill, and in particular its caps on noneconomic damages,
has been criticized: "[I]t's a plan to protect malpractice insurers. It will have
little, if any, effect on health care costs."'291  Caps have been further criti-
cized as a stale approach to the crisis because their constitutionality has al-
ready been questioned and rejected at the state level.292 Moreover, little
evidence exists that shows that statutory caps will lower insurance rates.293
Critics argue that rates are more accurately and closely tied to the insurance
284. H.R. 3037, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201-210 (1991). Section 201 contains definitions.
Section 203 abolishes joint and several liability. Section 205 requires the reduction of damage
awards by collateral source compensation, by abolishing the traditional collateral source rule,
except as provided in this section. Section 206 establishes a periodic payment plan for damage
awards. Section 207 encourages the establishment of alternative dispute resolution. Section
208 provides quality assurance reforms by improving state cooperations with federal effective-
ness research efforts, improving the performance of state medical boards, and establishing al-
terative programs. Section 209 outlines the implementation procedure. States that do not
comply with the bill within three years would not receive their full Medicare and Medicaid
funding increases. The withheld money would go into a pool of incentive payments for com-
plying states. 137 CONG. REC. E2717 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (statement of Rep. Bill Archer).
Section 210 permits the Secretary of Health and.Human Services in conjunction with the At-
torney General to waive the requirements of Title II if the state has already enacted an experi-
mental project or promulgation. Id. Title III outlines similar reforms to be implemented
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. H.R. 3037, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301-303 (1991).
285. H.R. 3037, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1991). Noneconomic damages are defined in
section 201(b) as "losses for physical and emotional pain, suffering, physical impairment, emo-
tional distress, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment, and loss of companionship,
services, consortium and other non-pecuniary losses incurred by the individual as a result of
negligence in the provisions of health care services as recognized by State law." Id. § 201 (b).
286. The limit will be indexed every three years to reflect changes in the cost of living.
H.R. 3037, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(c) (1991).
287. Id. § 204 (a)-(b).
288. Id. § 204(a).
289. 137 CONG. REC. E2716 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (statement of Rep. Bill Archer).
290. Id.




industry's investment income performance rather than to actual pay-out
risks.294 Washington's Insurance Commissioner, Dick Marquardt, con-
cluded that the procedures of rate review and the reporting of investment
income would stabilize the insurance market more effectively than tort re-
forms.295 "Bush's proposal is five years late and a proven failure to boot." '296
Lawyers and legal commentators criticize the caps because they are "un-
fair and unnecessary and tend to punish the most severely injured people
whose quality of life is destroyed by negligence."297 Legal commentators
assert that "[i]t is a totally regressive form of tort reform."'29 Additionally,
these kinds of proposed legislative changes have had mixed success on the
state level: Caps have produced an insignificant impact on insurance premi-
ums.299 States with caps continue to experience smaller increases in their
malpractice premiums."
Consumer groups such as the National Insurance Consumer Organization
argue that the inherent privilege granted health care providers in compari-
son to other tortfeasors is unfair.30 1 They suggest that the problem lies with
the doctors who should bear the burden of reform instead of the victims
whose rights are taken away.3 °2
Critics suggest that the recent decline in the medical malpractice insur-
ance crisis is misleading because the medical malpractice crisis -is a ten year
boom and bust cycle.303 Critics suggest that a new wave of litigation in med-
ical malpractice is possible as a result of the present financial troubles of the
insurance industry and the slight increase in the frequency of claims in
1990.
304
The Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act
of 1992 reaches a delicate balance between the need for tort reform and the
protection of the injured individual's right to adequate compensation. The
Health Care Bill combines a variety of tort reforms that are aimed at resolv-








301. Id. at 12.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.; see also Walter Wadlington, Medical Injury Compensation A Time for Testing New
Approaches, 265 JAMA 2861 (1991) (noting that the improved liability insurance climate is
transient and a renewed sense of crisis during this decade is forthcoming).
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through the statutory cap of $250,000 on noneconomic damages;305 it abol-
ishes both joint and several liability, 3°6 and the traditional collateral source
rule30 7 in the hope of reducing the excessive payment of damage awards by
insurance companies. The Health Care Bill eases the burden of damage pay-
ments by establishing a periodic payment plan instead of a lump-sum ap-
proach. 30 ' The bill also encourages the utilization of alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms.
309
Unlike state tort reform legislation, the bill permits the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to waive the imposition of the cap for good
cause shown. This provision highlights the inequity that may result when
the cap is imposed on the most severely injured victims of malpractice. This
"good cause" waiver permit individual states to determine whether or not
the cap will be imposed. If the state supreme court determines that the cap
is unconstitutional, the good cause requirement has been met and the cap is
not applicable. The Health Care Bill ultimately permits each state to deter-
mine whether the statutory cap is a reasonable means of providing adequate
health care at a reasonable cost. This provision of the act is the compromise
between the need to adequately compensate the injured and the need to limit
the liability of health care providers in an effort to ensure adequate health
care at an affordable cost.
The Health Care. Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act
of 1992 aimes to ease the medical malpractice insurance crisis. It contains
the proper level of tort reforms by balancing the need for limited liability on
health care providers without ignoring the inherent burden and inequity that
arises when statutory caps are imposed on the most severely injured. The
Health Care Bill, however, fails to address the problems within the medical
profession and insurance industry that contribute to the malpractice insur-
ance crisis. The Health Care Bill does not regulate the insurance rate struc-
ture nor does it provide a mechanism to eliminate or reduce frivolous claims.
In order to ultimately resolve the medical malpractice crisis, the burden of
attaining affordable health care for the public must not lie on the most se-
verely injured victims of medical malpractice. The medical malpractice cri-
sis is not a single problem created by the legal community. It is a series of
problems spanning the legal and medical profession as well as the insurance
industry. The medical profession and the insurance industry now must take
the initiative to resolve the medical malpractice crisis.







In response to the medical malpractice insurance crisis, twenty-seven
states enacted tort reform legislation including caps on damage recoveries.
Lawyers responded by challenging the constitutionality of statutory caps on
a variety of grounds. To date, ten states have invalidated statutory caps as
unconstitutional at either the federal or state level.
In response to an intensive lobbying effort, a federal tort reform package
entitled the Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement
Act of 1992 was introduced in July 1992. The Health Care Bill aimes to cure
the malpractice insurance crisis. It attempts to balance the need of limiting
liability on health care providers without ignoring the tremendous burden
and inequity placed on the most severely injured victims of malpractice. The
Health Care Bill contains a cap on liability with a waiver provision, thereby
addressing the argument that the absolute and arbitrary effect of a cap re-
sults in inherent inequities and that the element of discretion has been elimi-
nated. By including a waiver provision, the Health Care Bill attempts to
reduce the inequity by providing a discretionary element in the imposition of
the cap. The Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improve-
ment Act of 1992 attempts to attain that delicate balance between the pro-
tection of our health care profession through limited liability and the
protection of the right of the most severely injured victims to adequate
compensation.
Patricia J. Chupkovich
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